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Phronesis has been seen as a general guide to business ethics by sev-
eral authors (Giovanola and Fermani, 2012; Hartman, 2009; Moberg, 
2007; Rossouw, 2008; Solomon 1993). However, from our perspective 
the core of this guidance is the very nature of business rationality 
itself. Phronesis can be seen as the proper business rationality. 
Moreover, Aristotelian practical reason allows conciliating business 
ethics reasoning with personal responsibility. Indeed, phronesis does 
not require an unconditional ethical imperative or a mechanical ap-
plication of any universal principle to concrete cases as is the case 
with deontology (Kant, 1785) and utilitarianism (Bentham, 1789; Mill, 
1863; Mirrlees, 1982), respectively. On the contrary, in certain cir-
cumstances, the phronetic application of principles to concrete cases 
requires a personal choice of non-a priori ethical universal principles 
(e.g. duty, the utilitarian maximization of utility, personal care, jus-
tice as fairness, charity, and compassion, among others).  
By requiring a personal choice of non-a priori ethical universal prin-
ciples and by refusing a mechanical application of any universal prin-
ciple to concrete cases, phronesis can also be seen as an alternative 
approach to deontology (Kant, 1785) and utilitarianism (Mill, 1998) 
to deal with business ethics issues (Hartman, 1998, 2006, 2008; Sol-
omon, 1993, 1999). Indeed, a deontological and utilitarian approach 
to business ethics faces some well-known difficulties (e.g. Kantian 
practical reason does not offer a criterion for dealing with conflicting 
10
R-LEGO - Revista Lusófona de Economia e Gestão das Organizações n.º 4
rules (Crisp & Slote, 1997; Staveren, 2007), and utilitarian reasoning 
does not offer a suitable criterion to rank interests (e.g. Hsieh, 2007; 
Robbins, 1945; Sen, 1997, 2009; Simon, 1983). 
We acknowledge the multifaceted contribution of phronesis to busi-
ness ethics. Phronesis is undoubtedly valuable for managerial reform 
(Kane and Patapan, 2006), a suitable understanding of the morality 
of everyday activities in organizations (Nyberb, 2008), or mentoring 
(Moberg, 2008). Phronesis is also related not only to the importance 
of character in ethical rational decision-making (Athanassoulis and 
Ross, 2010; Bhuyan, 2007; Hartman, 2001; Solomon, 1993, among oth-
ers), but also to entrepreneurship (Dunham 2010; Dunham, McVea 
and Freeman 2008). Finally,  phronesis also provides a framework 
to guide regulators against corporate psychopathy (Marshall, Baden 
& Guidi 2012), to guide the development of management (Mcken-
na, 2005; Mckenna & Ronney, 2012; Rooney & Mckenna, 2006, 2007; 
Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997), and to guide business ethics in general 
(Giovanola & Fermani, 2012; Hartman, 2009; Moberg, 2007; Rossouw, 
2008; Solomon, 1993). 
We also acknowledge the increasing emphasis of Aristotelian virtue 
ethics in business ethics (Bragues, 2006; Desjardins, 1995; Hadreas, 
2002; Hartman, 1998, 2001, 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Meikle, 1996; Koehn, 
1998; Solomon, 1993, 1994, 2001, 2003, 2004). 
Nonetheless, and from our perspective Aristotelian practical reason 
not only can be understood as the main contribution of Aristotelian 
ethics to business ethics, but also allows overcoming the main diffi-
culties of a deontological and utilitarian approach to business ethics 
issues. Additionally, since the application of universal principles to 
concrete ones depends on a personal and communal deliberation, we 
also wish to show that Aristotelian practical reason does not avoid 
alienating personal responsibility. 
From these premises, we will first evaluate the main difficulties of 
deontological and utilitarian approaches to business ethics issues in 
the business ethics literature. Secondly, we will present phronesis as 
a personal and communal conception of rationality, which requires 
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that responsible persons are able, under certain circumstances, to 
relate a plurality of universal ethical principles to concrete cases.   
1.1. Some limitations of utilitarian rationality 
Although it is controversial, we can accept that profit is the main aim 
of business activity. Roughly defined as the surplus remaining after 
total costs are deducted from total revenue, and the basis on which 
tax is computed and dividend is paid (http://www.businessdiction-
ary.com/definition/profit.html), profit is the best known measure of 
success of economic activity in markets and organizations. 
Under the economic concept of rationality, profit results from the 
maximization of self-interest. When facing several courses of action, 
economic agents ought to choose the one that promotes or maximiz-
es the best self-interest (Smith, 1776; Weirich, 2004). In spite of the 
fact that this maximization does not reduce utility to self-interest — it 
can also include social goals (Sen, 1987, 2009; Weirich, 2004 - e.g. con-
cerns of fairness (Akerloff & Kranton, 2010) and commitments (Sen, 
1987, 2009)) — social well-being can result as the consequence of an 
invisible hand (Smith 1776), from which the sum or aggregation of in-
dividual selfish goals can contribute to social welfare. Social well-be-
ing can also be the consequence of political legislation (Friedman, 
1970; Levitt, 1958). 
Nevertheless, the paradoxes of economic rationality reveal that in-
stead of leading to collective welfare, economic rationality can lead 
to collective “worst-fare” (e.g. the prisoner’s dilemma (see Campbell 
& Sowden, 1985; Gauthier, 1985; Hardin, 1968; Harsanyi, 1977; Sen, 
1977, 1987, among others)). Accordingly, the economic concept of ra-
tionality has been challenged by alternative views of rationality, such 
as utilitarian and Kantian descriptions of rationality. 
Even if the utilitarian conception of rationality shares with economic 
description the ideal of maximization, classical utilitarian rational-
ity depends on the claim of maximization of the well-being or the 
happiness of the majority (Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1863; Mirrlees, 1982). 
Based on the principle of utility, “that property in any object,  whereby 
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it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness” 
(Bentham, 1789: I, III), any economic agent will always choose the 
interests that increase the sum of interests of the majority of indi-
viduals in the economic market or the majority of stakeholders in 
organizations. For that reason, under classical utilitarian rationality, 
profit ought to maximize the well-being of the majority. 
However, in Utilitarianism (1863), Mill stresses that the claim of hap-
piness, the utilitarian standard, requires that between “his own hap-
piness and that of the others, utilitarianism requires him to be as 
strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator” (Mill, 
1863: 2.18.5). The utilitarian hypothesis of the impartial, benevo-
lent, and spectator observer, implies that business agents, whether 
in markets or corporations, ought to be disinterested. The agent can 
rationally balance the majority of the considering interests only if his 
or her own interest is ignored. Otherwise, the calculation of overall 
utility will be biased. Therefore, under the utilitarian conception of 
reason business activity depends on a selfless conception of rational-
ity. Since no business agent can seek the safeguard of its self-interest, 
business activity implies that individuals ignore their own interest, 
which means that their own interests would be reduced to nothing 
more than those of an impartial spectator. 
Nevertheless, accepting that all the individuals would reason under 
an impartial concern, and the rule of reasoning would be the well-be-
ing of the majority, one cannot explain the relationship between 
self-interest and the well-being of the majority. Therefore, besides 
the conflict between utilitarian rationality with individual rights 
(Lantos, 2002; Rawls, 1971; Solomon, 1993) and liberties (Sen, 1990), 
and the sacrificial nature of utilitarian calculations (Barry, 1999; Lan-
tos, 2002; Rawls, 1971; Solomon, 1993), utilitarian rationality fails to 
explain the relationship between self-interest and the well-being of 
the majority.
Admitting, however, that utilitarian impartial calculations could be 
compatible with the self-interest, utilitarian rationality does not offer 
a suitable criterion to: a) rank interests or; b) choose among inter-
ests with the same utility. Considering the well-known controversy 
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about the rationality of comparison of utilities (e.g. Hsieh, 2007; Rob-
bins, 1945; Sen, 1997, 2009; Simon, 1983), and accepting the criticism 
against interpersonal comparisons of utilities, economic agents are 
condemned either to irrationality or to the incapacity of deliberation. 
Condemned to irrationality because economic agents will choose ar-
bitrarily; condemned to the incapacity of deliberation because if they 
did not wish to choose arbitrarily, they would feel like Buridan’s ass. 
Buridan’s ass describes a situation demonstrating the impracticality 
of decision-making using pure reason, especially a situation involv-
ing two equal choices. For example, a hungry and thirsty man cannot 
decide whether to slake first his thirst or his hunger, and dies in the 
meantime (http://wordsmith.org/words/buridans_ass.html). Similar 
to the hungry and thirsty man, the utilitarian agent led by the utilitar-
ian conception of impartial rationality can jeopardize stakeholders’ 
duties.  
 1.3. Kantian practical rationality 
 In Kantian moral philosophy the function of pure practical reason 
is to establish the principles that should prevail, deriving the actions 
from the law. Practical reason determines the human will (faculty of 
determining itself in accordance with the representation of certain 
laws) to act according to its representations a priori. Given the nature 
of the human person — both rational and sensible — the will is not 
absolutely good, since what it does is always in accord with reason. 
Therefore, the determination of the will by moral law is a constraint 
and the representation of a principle or law (concept of uncondition-
al necessity) is an imperative. Consequently, the moral law appears 
in the form of imperatives: categorical if it will be determined solely 
by reason, and the action is seen as an end in itself; hypothetical if 
the will is determined by the representation of the substance of the 
action and if the action is understood as a means to obtain an end. 
In Grundlegund zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) Kant proposes three 
formulations of the categorical imperative: act in such a way that 
your actions may be erected into a universal law (Kant, 1785: BA 52, 
53), act in such a way that your actions may be erected into a uni-
versal law of nature (Kant, 1785: BA 52, 53) , act in such a way as to 
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treat humanity in your person and others as an end and not a means 
(Kant, 1785: BA, 66, 67). The third formulation is perhaps the one that 
best reflects the essence of Kantian morality, not only because it clari-
fies the distinction between the categorical imperative and hypothet-
ical imperative, but also because it reveals the intentionality of the 
categorical imperative: when the human subject acts in accordance 
with this imperative he or she is raised to the dignity of a person, be-
ing understood as an end in itself and not as a means. 
Nevertheless, the understanding of persons as an end in them hard-
ly permits that economic agent can also calculate the interests of 
the others. Calculating interests, whether related to individuals or 
groups, demands a hypothetical imperative, and implies treating per-
sons as a means. Moreover, if profit is one of the main interests of 
business, from the Kantian conception of rationality business agents 
can then face the dilemma of increasing profit and neglecting ethics, 
or behaving ethically and ignoring profit. Although some social busi-
ness decisions have excluded profit (e.g. “3M’s decision to [curtail] 
its pollution despite economic loss” (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003: 515), 
business ethics is not incompatible with profit. 
As the Kantian conception of practical rationality does not allow con-
sidering interests, it offers, at best, a criterion to calculate interests, 
i.e. to consider equally all the interests (Freeman, 1994; Lantos, 2002; 
Arnold & Bowie, 2008). As persons are seen as ends in themselves, 
persons’ interests deserve equal respect. Nonetheless, the principle 
of equal respect does not offer a criterion by which to choose between 
competing and conflicting interests, or to decide among competing du-
ties (Lantos, 2002). A business agent (e.g. a corporate manager) will 
comply with those duties unequally or comply with only one of them. 
At worst, the corporate manager would behave as Buridan’s ass, and 
comply with none of them.
 Kantian practical reason also does not offer a criterion for dealing 
with conflicting rules and does not allow for exceptions (Crisp & 
Slote, 1997; Staveren, 2007). Since the increasing global scope of eco-
nomic activity demands a greater effort to reconcile social compet-
ing rules, practical deontological reason cannot help business agents 
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( consumers, managers or shareholders). For example, when dealing 
with a religious norm followed by consumers, such as respecting a sa-
cred tree (e.g. the Neem tree (Werhane, 2008), or following the norm 
of increasing the shareholders profits, Kantian deontology does not 
offer a criterion by which to choose between them. 
ii. 2. Phronesis relates private to social interests
The Aristotelian concept of practical rationality or phronesis seems to 
offer a suitable way of reasoning that allows any economic agent to 
rationally consider all interests. Why does this description of phrone-
sis offer a suitable way of reasoning for business activity? 
Phronesis, which can be translated as “wisdom” (Hardie, 1977; Hart-
man, 2009; MacDowell, 1997), “practical wisdom” (Beabout, 2012) or 
“prudence” (Aubenque 1963), is an intellectual virtue of the calcula-
tive faculty of the soul. This calculative faculty “contemplate[s] those 
things which admit variation” (Aristotle, 1999: 1139a 9-11), such as 
action, contrary to the scientific part of the soul, which contemplates 
the first and foremost invariable principles. The calculative faculty of 
the soul corresponds to our practical reason, a scientific [part of the 
soul] to our theoretical reason. Phronesis is therefore the excellence 
of reasoning of our practical reason, which is the reason that deliber-
ates about human action. As Aristotle distinguishes intellectual from 
moral virtues or virtues of character — roughly defined as a state in 
accord with the correct reason and as a habit of choosing the relative 
mean — prudence is then the intellectual virtue or the correct reason 
that guides moral virtues to always choose the relative mean in ac-
cordance with happiness. 
The moral and intellectual virtues of phronesis have different tasks: 
(a) “moral virtue enables us to achieve the end” (chosen by desire) 
and “makes the goal correct”. (Aristotle, 1999: 1145a 7, 5, 1144a 6, 
10, 1144a 10). The correct goal ought to be in accordance with the 
final end or happiness, which is the activity of reason followed by 
virtue, and; (b) “prudence makes us adopt the right mean to the end” 
or “makes the things promoting the goal [correct].” (Aristotle, 1999: 
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1145a 7, 5, 1144a 6, 10, 1144a 10). The excellence of the rational part of 
the soul prescribes the right means to the end chosen by desire. Pru-
dence is then prescriptive because it dictates or prescribes what “we 
ought to do or not to do.” (Aristotle, 1999: 1143a 10), i.e., it dictates or 
prescribes what means are allowed or forbidden to attain our ends. 
Since the object of rational deliberation is the means to promote our 
ends (Aristotle, 1999: 1112a 30), the excellence the right reason or 
orthos logos — which is not necessarily translated as right principle 
or correct reason (see Aubenque, 1963; Cottingham, 1991; Crombie, 
1962; Peters, 1967; Thornton, 1982) — consists of always choosing the 
means in accordance with the ultimate or sovereign end. 
Ethical practical reason, or phronesis, commands persons to relate 
their personal well-being with that of others. Actually, as a virtue, 
phronesis is the excellence of practical reason, because it always sup-
poses the search for the just means among competing interests. Per-
icles is the example of a prudent person because he belongs to the 
group of persons that “are able to study what is good for themselves 
and for human beings (…)”. (Aristotle, 1999: 1140b 8). Looking for 
the right means stresses the link between what is good for human 
beings and for personal interest. Any deliberation is then prudent if 
(a) the rational part chooses the right means if and only if it is based 
on correct reason; (b) the practical reason is only right or excellent 
if it is virtuous in that its deliberation follows the reasoning of the 
prudential human being. 
Not dissociating private interests from collective ones is one of the 
great advantages of Aristotelian rationality relative to Kantian deon-
tology and utilitarianism. Looking for the right means does not im-
ply any impartial reasoning, i.e. a selfless reason, as happens in the 
utilitarian and Kantian conceptualization of rationality, nor a selfish 
reason, as is sustained in the classical or neo-classical economic con-
cept of rationality. In this last case, when reasoning in accordance 
with phronesis, agents are not behaving from the perspective of each 
extreme, i.e. ‘individual’ ego. From this perspective, they can only 
be rational egoists. On the contrary, when reasoning under phrone-
sis, business agents are simultaneously weighing their personal and 
their collective interests. Prudent business agents clearly include in 
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their personal calculation what is good for themselves and for hu-
man beings. They “make money” promoting, then, happiness. 
One may wonder if “making money” and happiness could be com-
patible under the Aristotle’s distinction between the chrematistic ex-
change and the economic one (Aristotle, 2002: 1256b, 41 and 1257b, 
24-25; see also Bragues, 2006; Collins, 1987; Hadreas, 2002; Meikle, 
1996; Solomon, 1993), according to the refusal of the chrematistic ex-
change “making money” as the only aim of businessmen. Neverthe-
less, that distinction and refusal do not avoid the personal ambition 
of “making money” under the command of phronesis, and do not en-
tail a gap between “making money” and happiness. For instance, on 
the one hand, Aristotle explicitly relates ethical deliberation to mak-
ing money (Aristotle, 1999: 1112b 4, 1112b 15) framing the choice of 
the means by the “rule” of the right reason. On the other hand, even 
though Aristotelian ethics recognizes the ambiguity of the expression 
“ambitious” (Aristotle, 1999: 1225b 13) and the lack of a proper mid-
dle term between ambition and the lack thereof, it explicitly men-
tions that “there is a mean and also excess and deficiency in getting 
and giving money” (Aristotle, 1999: 1225b 8-9). 
How does the ambitious person, who wants to make money behave 
in accordance with phronesis? As a state in accord with the correct 
reason and as a habit of choosing the relative means, the ambitious 
virtuous person led by phronesis, avoids making an excess of money, 
i.e. avoids greed, and also avoids making insufficient money, apathy. 
He or she also avoids excess in giving money, i.e. being a spendthrift, 
and analogously, the deficiency of giving money, avarice. According-
ly, and unlike being greed, being a spendthrift or being stingy (i.e. 
not being able to find the just means between excess and deficiency, 
ambitious men or women are simultaneously generous people. Actu-
ally, generosity is the virtue in spending and giving “anything whose 
worth is measured by money” (Aristotle, 1999: 1119b 25-26). Excess is 
wastefulness and the deficiency is miserliness. 
How can the ambitious person avoid the extremes? Given the differ-
ent tasks of moral virtues and phronesis, and the teleological struc-
ture of Aristotelian virtue ethics, personal ambition is a moral virtue 
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— or virtue of character —, and “to make money” is therefore the 
end, as prudence makes us want to attain the right means to attain 
this end. Thus, ambitious generous persons relate the rational part 
of their soul to the guidance provided by the excellence of the right 
reason (orthos logos). Actually, the excellent rational deliberation re-
fers to the choice of means to make money in accordance with the 
sovereign good, satisfying both the personal and the common ends. 
Ambitious persons are, then, concerned with their personal interest 
as well as the interest of others. In other words, the ambitious virtu-
ous person is able to find the just means between his or her personal 
ambition and that of others, who are equally ambitious and to be 
concerned with his or her personal interest as well as the interest of 
others. 
The unethical behavior of an ambitious business agent can then re-
sult in the failure to choose the right means to “make money” as dic-
tated by phronesis. For example, the search for the right means would 
not allow someone to borrow money without having the means to 
pay the interest on the loan, as it happened with borrowers in the 
housing bubble and the subsequent subprime crisis (Helwig, 2009; 
Krugman, 2009; Shiller, 2008; Stiglitz, 2010a, 2010b, et al.). Converse-
ly, phronesis would also not allow lending money to people that were 
not able to support loan repayments, or to offer below-market rates 
of interest for the first few months to two years or teaser rates (tem-
porary low rates that exploded after a few years), having in mind 
the rise of the interest rates that would compensate those low initial 
interest rates (Krugman, 2009; Stiglitz 2010a, 2010b. Phronesis would 
surely command the behavior of Dame Anita Roddick, Ben & Jerry’s 
(Lager, 1994) and Malden Mills (De George, 2010), who can be seen as 
the example of prudent and generous business agents. As generous 
economic agents, they simultaneously chose what is good for them-
selves and for human beings. In reality, they were neither greedy 
nor apathetic in making money, nor spendthrifts or misers in giving 
money. The concerns with the environment and the fair pay to the 
producers ethically limit the means for making money. Similarly, the 
best pay, as well as the safeguard for the working conditions for their 
employees, along the concern with for making safe products for her 
consumers exempts them from avarice. Ben & Jerry’s, Malden Mills, 
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and Dame Anita Roddick clearly integrated into their personal cal-
culations the interests of consumers, employees and members of the 
community that allowed them to “make money”, thereby promoting 
happiness. 
2.1. Phronesis, rules and concrete cases  
The understanding of Ben & Jerry’s, Malden Mills, and Dame Anita 
Roddick’s reasoning under phronesis shows us that phronetic rea-
soning is understood as a bargaining reasoning in which every busi-
ness agent struggles to gain the advantage. Their reasoning is based 
on circumstantial general principles. In fact, it is even indisputable 
that phronesis deals with particulars and concrete cases (Allan, 1977; 
Curzer, 2015; Solomon, 1993; Hartman, 2008, 2009; Wiggins, 2001; 
Sorabji, 1980), just as ethical act demands knowledge of particu-
lar facts — correct reason ought to deliberate about the particular 
means in particular situations for fulfilling its task virtuously. The 
result of this deliberation is decision, which consists of applying uni-
versal principles to particular situations (Aristotle, 1999: 1112b 26, 
1139a21-1139b 5, 1141b14, 1142a20, 1144a32, 1147a2, 25). Prudence 
deals with particulars, but that does not mean that it excludes uni-
versals (Aristotle, 1999: 1141b 15,  1142b 15, 1142a 23; Beabout 2012; 
Curzer; Sorabji 1980). Aristotle (1999: 1142a14-15) clearly states that 
“prudence is concerned with particulars as well as universals”. Un-
der phronesis agents have universal suppositions, and apply them to 
particulars. Thus, any ethical behavior is always based on the right 
principle(s), which in turn offer us the right answer(s). I remind the 
reader that when arguing against the person who lacks self-restraint, 
Aristotle distinguishes “lower animals” from human beings on the 
basis that the former have “no universal supposition, but [only] ap-
pearance and memory of particulars” (Aristotle, 1999: 1147b 5-6) . 
Consequently, one thing is to be aware about the difficulty and the 
importance of experiencing the knowledge of the particulars (Ar-
istotle, 1999: 1112a15), as well as the impossibility of always sub-
suming concrete cases under general principles (Aristotle, 1999: 
1141b25-1142a10). It is a completely different thing to deny that the 
knowledge of the particulars dismisses the importance of universal 
principles, and the impossibility of subsuming concrete cases under 
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general principles entails giving up the search for rules. In reality, 
when arguing about justice, Aristotle (1999: 1141b25-1142a10) ac-
knowledges that sometimes general principles are unsatisfactory. In 
this case we have to look for a decree, i.e. to a particular rule applied 
to that concrete case. 
Consequently, when behaving ethically, rational human beings not 
only relate means to ends, but also rules to concrete cases (Allan, 
1977; Curzer, 2015). Thus, on the one hand ethical behavior consists 
of applying principles to particulars, looking for the already more or 
less existing general principles to inform individual choice. On the 
other hand, ethical rules result from the deliberation process itself 
(Allan, 1977; Curzer, 2015).
Since the content of the principles results from the deliberation pro-
cess, phronesis allows fitting concrete cases with general ethical prin-
ciples of the right reason, such as Kantian categorical imperative, 
the utility principle, the market efficiency principle, or the justice of 
fairness principle. For example, when giving the best pay to their em-
ployees Ben & Jerry’s, Malden Mills, and Dame Anita Roddick behaved 
according principles of justice. Nevertheless, the quest for justice was 
not led by spendthrift and did not clash with the market principle of 
efficiency. Otherwise, their corporations would go into bankruptcy 
and the employees would loose their jobs, the producers could not 
sell their products, the consumers could not buy environmentally 
friendly products, and as employers Ben & Jerry’s, Malden Mills, and 
Dame Anita Roddick would loose their money. These employers’ deci-
sions Ben & Jerry’s, Malden Mills, and Dame Anita Roddick decisions 
followed several ethical principles, showing that phronesis implies a 
pluralistic approach to rules. 
When applying principles to particulars, agents do not limit them-
selves to looking for the only existent general principles that already 
exist, but also look for new and particular rules. Phronesis also allows 
fitting concrete cases with unformulated and unforeseen ethical prin-
ciples. Roughly, and regardless of the complexity of the theoretical 
apparatus explaining the relationships between rules and concrete 
cases in Aristotelian ethics, the right principles are chosen under 
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 circumstances. They ought not to be understood in an aprioristic 
Kantian conception (Cottingham, 1991; Queiroz, 2012) or in a utilitar-
ian perspective (Solomon, 1993). Although the attribution of univer-
sal rules or principles can be seen as a neo-Kantian interpretation of 
Aristotelian thought (Wiggins, 2001), that right principle cannot be 
understood in an aprioristic Kantian conception of rationality. The 
calculation of practical reason in Kant erases, among other features, 
the consideration of circumstances, whether spatial, temporal, or 
emotional. On the contrary, when looking for the right means phro-
nesis faces circumstances that are not the same for each individual 
across time and for different individuals at the same time. Therefore, 
if acting on the basis of phronesis implies subsuming the particular 
case under a general principle, this inclusion of the “inner” task ad-
justs to the relative means for us not only under some circumstances, 
but is also dependent on them. 
Accepting that principles are based on phronesis is also different from 
the deliberation of the utilitarian impartial observer. Unlike the pru-
dent man or woman, the utilitarian impartial legislator does not have 
any particular interest, ought to order the utilities based on a cardi-
nal measurement (Mill, 1863), and mechanically applies the principle 
to particular cases. Aristotelian practical rationality is incompatible 
with mechanical, rigid, and aprioristic application of laws to concrete 
cases. Rules ought to adapt to cases as “the lead standard (…) adapts 
itself to the shape of the stone” (Aristotle, 1999: 1137b 30). 
In sum, from the perspective of phronesis general rules can not be 
understood as moral dicta. They are the result of personal delibera-
tion about particular means in particular situations (Beabout, 2012; 
Curzer, 2015; Queiroz, 2012), and they imply finding a means that 
will foster the happiness of both agents. General rules about phrone-
sis can not also be understood as rules of thumb, applied mechanical-
ly to concrete cases. 
Personal responsibility and collective deliberation 
Since rules are not moral dictas or rules of thumb, the reasoning un-
der phronesis necessarily requires personal responsibility. Although 
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personal responsibility would be better clarified through the dis-
tinction between voluntary and non-voluntary acts (Aristotle, 1999, 
1009b30- 1111b5; see also Irwin, 1980), throughout an analysis of 
the relationship between desire and reason (Irwin, 1980), personal 
responsibility is also manifested in the choice of the means. Addi-
tionally, personal responsibility is shown through the choice of the 
general principles. No one can dismiss the personal responsibility 
in choosing the right means guided by a general principle. In other 
words, personal responsibility expresses itself in practical decisions 
(Hutchinson, 1995; Irwin, 1980). Dame Anita Roddick, Ben & Jerry’s 
and Malden Mills were responsible for their behavior. However, peo-
ple who borrowed money without having the means to pay the inter-
ests rates, or who lend money to people who are unable to support 
loan repayments are no less responsible for their choices.  
Personal responsibility is also shown in the engaging (or not) in a 
collective deliberation. Since rational deliberation demands finding 
the relative means within us in order to take into consideration the 
relative means between the individual self and the way other beings 
would respond in the same situation, phronesis is a collective way 
of reasoning or a communal reasoning (Queiroz, 2012). This com-
munal reasoning implies that “we enlist partners (…) on large issues 
when we distrust our own ability to discern [the right answer] (…)” 
(N.E., 1112b 13-14, emphasis added). It is not by chance that Auben-
que (1963) stresses that the word deliberation (bouleusis) comes from 
(boule), which in Homer employed to designate the Council of An-
cients, and in Athenian democracy, the Council of Five Hundred. 
This communal way of reasoning means, then, that business activi-
ty demands a collective reasoning, mostly in corporations, allowing 
managers and executives to overcome the well-known difficulty of 
balancing competing interests by managers or executives (Heath, 
2006). Indeed, although business rationality in economic markets can 
also be understood under Aristotelian rationality, the corporate na-
ture of business activity seems handily explained under Aristotelian 
rationality. The profit of corporations depends on a collective activity, 
requiring enlisting partners. Although this is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition, to act on the basis of phronesis we (can enlist 
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partners to discern an unethical answer to a situation (e.g. the case 
of Enron)), corporations’ goals are easier solved by a communal rea-
son. In other words, it is externally easier, for example, to consider 
the interests of every stakeholder if managers in corporations enlist 
customers, suppliers, shareholders, and the community as partners 
for solving collective problems. It is also internally easier to solve 
organizational problems under a collective deliberation. 
Thus, the communal business ethics reasoning does not dismiss per-
sonal responsibility in deliberating collectively. The communal scope 
of phronesis only reveals that on the one hand social problems can 
not be solved only by particular and selfish individuals alone; on the 
other hand the quest for solutions is not based on selfish and egoist 
reasons. Even if economic selfish rationality is not forcibly irrespon-
sible, its commonly selfish scope can be valuable to the majority or 
even to all the individuals only by chance. Business ethics personal 
responsibility therefore requires choosing the right and universal 
principle according to circumstances, and engaging in a collective 
deliberation. Therefore, even if looking for the right means is a nec-
essary condition for behaving ethically, it is not a sufficient one. Phr-
onetic business decision-making requires the capacity to collectively 
search for ethical principles. 
conclusion 
As a practical reason that always relates individual interest with the 
collective one, phronesis necessarily follows the reasoning of any 
business agent. The utilitarian impartial observer (Bentham, 1789; 
Mill, 1863; Smith, 1776), the intricate issue of comparison of utilities 
(Hsieh, 2007; Robbins, 1945; Sen, 1997, 2010; Simon, 1983, among oth-
ers), and the sacrificial nature of utilitarian calculation (Barry, 1999; 
Lantos, 2002; Rawls, 1971; Solomon, 1993) allow (but only with diffi-
culty) a clear justification of the relationship between individual in-
terest and the collective. Similarly, from a deontological perspective 
of rationality, it is difficult to link individual interest to social interest. 
The Kantian concept of rationality does not offer a sound criterion 
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by which to choose among competing duties, rules, and interests in 
business activity.
Since phronesis unites the interests of the others in our reasoning, 
implying a communal way of reasoning that looks for general prin-
ciples under particular circumstances, the relationship between in-
dividual interest and the collective is at the heart of any economic 
agent’s practice. Phronetic principles are not moral dicta or rules of 
thumb, always requiring either personal responsibility in his or her 
choice, or the choice of the means under the excellence of the right 
reason. Phronesis offers, then, to business ethics a way of reasoning 
that allows articulating self-interested ends with collective ones un-
der a non alienable and revocable quest for personal responsibility.  
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